This paper explores the relationship between funding liquidity and credit default swap (CDS) spreads, evidencing the effects of the regulatory changes brought about by the introduction of the CDS Small Bang reforms for CDS contracts on European reference
Introduction
What determines the spreads on credit default swaps (CDS)? In this paper, we investigate how funding liquidity, defined as the ease with which traders can acquire funds and finance their operations, impacts CDS spreads. At least three clear motives for this examination can be identified: firstly, a tightening of funding constraints impairs the capacity of dealers to take sides in new CDS contracts as they face higher costs of hedging their positions and higher inventory costs (Tang and Yan, 2008) ; secondly, the Global Financial Crisis saw both a large drop in funding liquidity and the accusation that holding CDS positions exacerbated financial market complacency about risk; and thirdly, the set of regulatory reforms known as the CDS Small Bang, were introduced in the European market in June 2009 to facilitate standardization and central clearing. The introduction of this latter regulation gave rise to upfront fees that need to be exchanged between CDS buyers and sellers and are thus more likely to make spreads more sensitive to tightening funding conditions, given the additional funding to be raised.
The CDS market saw a period of unprecedented growth in the mid-2000s , with the gross notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts rising to approximately $57 trillion by June 2008 according to the Bank for International Settlements data. Tang and Yan (2008) argue that this growth stemmed from the need of banks and insurance companies to hedge their bond and loan exposures and from the willingness of hedge funds to use CDS as a tool for speculating on credit risk. Early studies (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005) contend that CDS spreads (hereafter 'spreads'), which represent the premiums paid by the buyer to insure against the default of the reference name, mainly contain information relating to the credit risk of the reference entity. However, more recently, studies highlight the importance of liquidity components such as CDS liquidity (e.g., Tang and Yan, 2008; Bongaerts et al., 2011; Coro et al., 2013; Pires et al., 2015) and individual firm equity liquidity (Das and Hanouna, 2009) .
Although the effect of funding liquidity has been examined in other markets its influence in CDS markets remains under investigated. We remedy this by employing monthly data on a sample spanning the period January 2008 to March 2013 2 , a balanced panel of CDS entities in the European iTraxx index and associated firm-specific credit and liquidity variables as well as macroeconomic factors which have been previously documented to affect spreads. The funding illiquidity 3 measures employed, namely the three-month European TED spread measure (EuTed) and the three-month Euribor-Eurepo spread (EuRepo), are related to interbank interest rates and reflect the cost of acquiring funds to finance operations.
Our panel estimations provide several new results. In particular, it is found that changes in funding illiquidity have a highly significant and positive effect on CDS spreads; in line with the hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity encourages CDS protection sellers to reduce the supply of contracts as they incur increased inventory and hedging costs, and subsequently reducing CDS liquidity. Notably, in the post-CDS Small Bang period we find that this positive effect is of much higher magnitude. Moreover, we find that changes in funding illiquidity have a three times larger effect on high-spread as compared to low-spread CDS entities, the former's higher default risk causing a higher sensitivity to funding liquidity considerations 4 . When we combine the post-Small Bang period and high-spread entities, it is found that funding liquidity changes are the most 2 The sample starts in January 2008 to preserve the number of firms in our sample due to data availability on CDS quotes as well as associated stock market data on reference entities. The sample ends in March 2013, as the credit valuation adjustment applied to the price of derivative instruments to account for counterparty credit risk was implemented in the first quarter of 2013. 3 Typically, the extant literature refers to funding 'illiquidity' measures rather than funding liquidity. 4 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) predict that riskier assets are more sensitive to funding effects. Pires et al. (2015) further evidence that other explanatory variables have a larger impact on high-spread entities.
important determinant of spread changes in terms of explanatory power, among all liquidity variables investigated.
Through this study we contribute to two strands of literature. Firstly, we add to the literature investigating the effects of funding constraints on financial markets (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Gromb and Vayanos, 2010 ; Comerton-Forde et al., 2010) . Most notably, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) theorize that under certain market conditions, such as when capital availability is scarce, a deterioration of funding liquidity negatively impacts investors willingness and ability to invest in high-risk securities as they add on more risk, thus leading to reductions in market liquidity and increased volatility. The resulting reduction in market liquidity further increases the sensitivity of market liquidity to future funding liquidity changes.
Secondly, by documenting that funding illiquidity changes affect spread changes, this paper contributes to the growing literature investigating the determinants of CDS spreads (e.g., Blanco et al. 2005; Tang and Yan, 2008; Ericsson et al. 2009; Greatrex 2009; Coro et al. 2013; Annaert et al. 2013; Galil et al. 2014; Pires et al. 2015) . Research examining the determinants of spreads has gone a long way in explaining these, from early studies attributing the level of the spread of an entity mainly to credit risk variables (e.g. Longstaff et al. 2005 , Zhang et al. 2009 ) to ascribing a substantial part of the spread variability to liquidity components and market-wide variables (e.g. Bongaerts et al. 2011; Coro et al. 2013; Galil et al. 2014; Pires et al. 2015) . To this end, our work now stresses the importance of allowing for funding illiquidity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 outlines the hypotheses, data and variables to be used in the analysis and section 3 presents the models employed.
Section 4 provides the empirical results, whilst section 5 details the robustness checks performed. Finally, section 6 presents some policy recommendations and section 7 concludes.
Hypotheses and Data

Hypotheses
When considering how funding illiquidity might affect CDS spreads, Kamga and Wilde (2017) consider that a funding liquidity contraction drives CDS traders to steer away from risky assets, thus reducing the liquidity of the CDS market, in line with the theoretical model proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) . Furthermore, confirming these predictions, Junge and Trolle (2015) construct a measure of CDS market liquidity which correlates strongly, among other factors, with funding liquidity, and find that liquidity risk is priced in the cross-section of single-name CDS returns. The above-mentioned studies suggest that funding liquidity positively impacts CDS market liquidity. However, as shown, among others, by Bongaerts et al. (2011) and Coro et al. (2013) , spreads are highly sensitive to changes in CDS liquidity, a deterioration of CDS liquidity increasing spreads, as CDS protection sellers require a premium for illiquidity.
Therefore, we would expect funding illiquidity changes to positively impact CDS spread changes through their effect on CDS illiquidity.
Relatedly, the CDS Small Bang, was introduced in the European market on 20 th June 2009 to facilitate standardization and central clearing. Before the protocol changes came to effect, trading of CDS contracts was done at a coupon rate that fixed the contract value to zero on the inception day, no upfront fee needing to be exchanged (Markit, 2009; Wang et al. 2018) . Among other regulatory changes, the CDS Small Bang conventions restrict coupon rates to be fixed at 25bps, 100bps, 500bps and 1000bps (Markit, 2009 ).
However, the introduction of fixed coupons gave rise to upfront fees that need to be exchanged between CDS buyers and sellers, the size of the fee depending on how far away the spread level is from the fixed coupons at which the contract settles (Wang et al. 2018) . Periods when funding is tight should thus more strongly negatively affect spread liquidity after the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations, due to the need of paying additional upfront fees for trading CDS. The resulting decline in CDS liquidity would then be transmitted onto spreads as CDS traders require a premium for illiquidity.
Finally, a priori, it might be expected that high-spread CDS firms are more affected by changes in funding illiquidity as they carry relatively more default risk; a tightening of funding liquidity leading these entities closer to the default barrier compared to low-CDS spread firms. Moreover, on average, high-spread firms are more likely to have a spread further away from one of the fixed coupons introduced after the CDS Small Bang.
Therefore, a higher fee would need to be exchanged between buyers and sellers for contracts written on high-spread reference entities, leading to a greater reduction in individual CDS liquidity and a higher spread.
The hypotheses examined in this study can be summarized as follows: Firstly, we argue that a tightening (relaxation) of funding liquidity increases (decreases) CDS spreads through its effect on CDS liquidity. Secondly, we suggest that the effect of funding liquidity changes on spread changes is stronger in the post-June 2009 period, due to the introduction of an upfront fee that is exchanged between CDS buyers and sellers, unless the spread level of an entity is exactly equal to one of the fixed coupon payments.
Thirdly, we hypothesize that high-spread firms display more sensitivity to changes in funding liquidity than low-spread firms.
Data
Our dataset combines two main sources, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Datastream.
From the former we source data on CDS spread mid, bid and ask quotes as well as market rates on the three-month Euribor rate and German Government BuBill maturing in three months. 5 From the latter, we source stock market data such as bid, ask and adjusted close stock prices for the reference entities on which the CDS contracts are written.
Macroeconomic interest rate data such as the ten-year and three-year Euro-area 
By performing panel regressions using first differences of our variables, rather than levels, we contribute to the growing literature examining the determinants of CDS spread changes (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al, 2001; Ericsson et al, 2009; Greatrex, 2009 ).
Funding liquidity
Low funding liquidity leads CDS protection sellers to steer away from risky assets, thus decreasing the liquidity of the CDS market (Kamga and Wilde, 2017) . This argument is supported by the findings of Tang and Yan (2008) who find that a tightening of funding 7 Previous studies investigating the determinants of CDS spread changes in the European market (Coro et al, 2013; Annaert et al, 2013) and in the U.S. market (Galil et al, 2014) also found evidence of non-stationarity in spread levels. 
Control Variables
We investigate the presence of a relationship between changes in funding illiquidity and spread changes, while controlling for a set of additional firm-specific and macro-economic credit risk and liquidity variables previously documented to impact CDS spreads. The choice of control variables is inspired by the Merton (1974) model and by more recent studies documenting the influence of liquidity and macroeconomic factors on CDS spreads (e.g. Coro et al, 2013; Bongaerts et al, 2011; Annaert et al, 2013) . A summary of the explanatory variables as well as a summary of the expected relationships between the changes in explanatory variables and changes in CDS spreads are presented in Table 1 .
Stock return
The model introduced by Merton (1974) suggests that a decrease in a firm's market value of equity leads to a higher probability of default for the respective firm. In line with Galil et al. (2014), we use monthly stock returns as indicators of changes in a firm's market value of equity. We expect a negative relationship between stock returns and CDS spread changes as a decrease in stock returns would increase the probability of default of the firm, which would be captured through an increase in the spread of the respective entity.
Stock return volatility
In the framework of Merton (1974), higher firm value volatility increases the probability of reaching the default threshold. Therefore, higher firm value volatility would increase the CDS spread of an entity. However, firm value volatility is unobservable, but can be approximated through the historical volatility of stock returns (Alexander and Kaeck, 2008; Ericsson et al. 2009 ). Monthly volatility is measured as the monthly historical standard deviation of daily stock returns over the past month.
CDS volatility
High CDS volatility suggests that market participants revise their views on the creditworthiness of an entity quickly, reflecting uncertainty regarding the correct spread levels (Raunig, 2018) . Therefore, an increase in CDS volatility is expected to lead to higher spreads, as CDS sellers seek compensation for increased uncertainty. CDS volatility is computed as the monthly historical standard deviation of daily spreads over the past month.
Scaled equity bid-ask spread
In the framework of Das and Hanouna (2009) Following Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Das and Hanouna (2009), we use the scaled equity bid-ask spread, measured as the difference between the ask and bid prices divided by the mid-point of the two, to proxy for equity illiquidity transaction costs which are expected to be positively related to CDS spreads.
Absolute CDS bid-ask spread
Tang and Yan (2008) and Pires et al. (2015) show that CDS illiquidity costs represent an important determinant of spreads. Moreover, Bongaerts et al. (2011) develop a model where CDS returns depend on CDS transaction costs, a liquidity premium being earned by the CDS contract seller. We follow Pires et al. (2015) and focus on the absolute, rather than the relative, bid-ask spread, as the authors convincingly show that the absolute measure should be used in the context of the CDS market.
Risk-free rate
The level of the riskless interest rate has been considered an important component of default probability since the model of Merton (1974). On one hand, an increase in the riskfree interest rate decreases the risk-adjusted default probability leading to a decrease in spreads (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Collin-Dufresne et al, 2001 ). On the other hand,
as Coro et al. (2013) argue, higher interest rates can also suppress growth through an increase in borrowing costs leading to an increase in spreads, such an effect being more prominent in a period of increased sovereign risk such as seen in the European market starting from late 2009. Therefore, we consider the relationship between the riskless interest rate and CDS spreads as undetermined and examine whether the effect of the riskfree rate on spreads changes throughout the different sample periods. Following Coro et al. (2013) , the risk-free rate is measured through the Euro-area government bond with a maturity of 10-years.
Term structure slope
Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that an increase in the slope of the yield curve predicts economic growth and improves recovery rates, thus decreasing spreads. However, a steepening of the slope could also reduce the number of positive net present value projects available to firms, leading to an increase in default probability and an increase in spreads (Galil et al, 2014) . Therefore, as with the risk-free rate, we leave the expected relationship between the slope of the term structure and CDS spreads as undetermined and examine whether the relationship changes within the different sub-samples investigated. The term-structure slope is measured through the difference between the ten-year and three-year Euro-area Government bond yields.
Market-wide volatility
Market-wide volatility can be considered a measure of business climate, an increase in market-wide volatility indicating heightened uncertainty regarding economic prospects, leading to an increase in spreads (Annaert et al, 2013; Greatrex, 2009 ). We measure market volatility through the VSTOXX implied volatility index obtained from options written on the Euro STOXX 50 index.
Methodology
To test the impact of funding illiquidity and other firm-specific and macroeconomic factors on CDS spread changes, we estimate a set of multivariate regressions depicted in equations (2), (3) and (4) 
In the models presented in equations (2)- (4), the dependent variable is the monthly CDS spread change, while the explanatory variables are as described in Table 1 .
measures the monthly funding liquidity changes and is proxied, in turn, by monthly changes in the three-month European TED spread ( ) and three-month Eurepo spread ( ). Model 1 estimates the impact of firm-specific credit and liquidity factors on spread changes. Model 2 augments Model 1 alternatively with the two funding illiquidity factors to examine the influence of changes in funding illiquidity on spread changes when controlling for firm-specific determinants. Lastly, Model 3 investigates the impact of funding illiquidity changes on spread changes when controlling for both firmspecific and macro-economic factors. Following Coro et al. (2013) , all three models are estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
We estimate the above models on the entire sample of firms as well as on the top and bottom terciles (top and bottom 33%) of entities according to their spread levels. By performing these estimations, we can test whether spread changes of high spread (high default risk) firms react differently to changes in funding illiquidity and other explanatory variables than those of low spread (low risk) firms. In line with previous findings documented by Pires et al. (2015) , we expect the effects of explanatory variables on spread changes of high CDS firms to be larger in magnitude than on low CDS firms, as negative shocks to either credit or liquidity variables would drive high CDS entities, which carry more credit and liquidity risk, closer to the default barrier. Investigating the macroeconomic control variables, we find that changes in risk free rate have a significant negative relationship with spread changes, while market volatility increases spreads. These results are in line with our hypotheses and with results from previous studies such as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) . Changes in the term structure slope do not have a significant impact on spread changes.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Examining panels (b) and (c) of Table 4 , we find that the positive relationship between funding illiquidity changes and spread changes remains significant when investigating high CDS firms' and low CDS firms' separately. The magnitude of the funding effect is approximately three times larger when investigating high-spread entities compared to the funding effect on low-spread entities. This highlights the fact that highspread (higher default risk) entities are more sensitive to changes in funding conditions compared to low-spread (lower default risk) firms, consistent with the hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity would affect high risk firms more than low risk firms as investors shy away from riskier assets following a funding contraction (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) . The coefficients of the variables explaining spread changes remain significant and of the same signs as in the estimation using the entire sample of firms, except for the coefficient of equity illiquidity which becomes insignificant when examining low spread entities. Table 5 and Table 6 Table 5 and Table 6 , panel (a) presents results for the entire sample of firms, while panels (b) and (c) present results for the high-spread and low-spread firms within the two subsamples, respectively.
Sub-sample results
Investigating Table 5 , results suggest that funding illiquidity changes do not show a significant impact on CDS spread changes during the pre-CDS Small Bang period. We consider that this result arises because during the Global Financial Crisis, a period which overlaps with the pre-CDS Small Bang sub-sample, tightening of funding liquidity led to a reduction in CDS market liquidity and individual CDS illiquidity which dramatically increased the explanatory power of individual CDS illiquidity on CDS spread changes relative to explanatory factors. Indeed, the magnitude of the effect of CDS illiquidity changes on spread changes is much larger during the pre-CDS Small Bang period, compared to the period following the implementation of the regulatory changes. In a related study, Annaert et al. (2013) shows that CDS bid-ask spreads have a more pronounced effect on changes in the CDS price during the Global Financial Crisis compared to the pre-crisis period and that the explanatory power of CDS bid-ask spreads in univariate regressions grows from 0.30% before the crisis to 6.96% during the crisis.
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Moreover, we note that the coefficients relating to stock returns, equity volatility, changes in CDS bid-ask spreads, risk free rate and term-structure slope are generally significant in both high and low subsamples as well as when considering the whole sample of firms.
Interestingly, we obtain larger adjusted 2 values, of up to 43.88%, when performing estimations on low spread entities suggesting that our explanatory variables explain better CDS spread changes of low-risk entities compared to those of high risk firms during this turbulent period.
Examining Table 6 , we note that funding illiquidity changes have a positive and highly significant effect on CDS spread changes in the post-CDS Small Bang period. This is in line with our expectation, since the introduction of an upfront fee to be paid for all CDS transactions when the spread is not equal to one of the fixed coupons introduced by the CDS Small Bang regulations brings about an additional cost incurred by CDS traders which reduces their willingness to trade, reducing CDS market liquidity (Wang et al, 2018) . 11 In turn, this leads to a premium being demanded by CDS sellers to compensate for illiquidity, increasing spreads (Bongaerts et al, 2011; Coro et al, 2013) . The effect of funding illiquidity changes on spread changes is approximately three to five times larger in size for high CDS firms compared to low CDS firms. We also document that stock returns and changes in equity volatility, CDS bid-ask spreads, slope yield and market 10 Employing univariate regressions, we further document that the explanatory power of CDS liquidity changes on spread changes is largest during the pre-CDS Small Bang sample, while funding liquidity changes tend to provide the highest explanatory power in relation to spread changes in the post-CDS Small Bang regime. Results are available upon request.
11 Using multivariate regressions, we typically find that both funding liquidity proxies have a significant positive impact on CDS liquidity changes, confirming the transmission channel of funding costs to spreads. Results are available upon request.
volatility have a significant impact on spread changes when investigating the entire sample of firms as well as in the high and low-CDS subsamples. Interestingly, changes in riskfree rate display a positive relationship with spread changes. Although surprising at first, this result is in line with the hypothesis that an increase in risk free rates increases borrowing costs, thus suppressing growth as is the case in the European market after the end of 2009 (Coro et al, 2013) . During the post-CDS Small Bang period, we find that the models can explain a larger part of spread changes when evaluating high-CDS firms. This result is in line with the findings of Pires et al. (2015) who document that the goodness of fit of models explaining spreads increases with CDS premiums. We obtain adjusted 2 values reaching up to 45.34% for the entire sample of firms and 50.55% for high-CDS firms. However, our models perform worse in explaining spread changes of low risk firms after the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations compared to the period preceding the regulatory changes.
Robustness Checks
To further investigate the change in the effects of funding illiquidity changes and of other explanatory variables on spread changes before and after the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations, we re-estimate Model 3 adding a dummy variable isolating the pre-CDS Small Bang period as well as interaction terms between all explanatory variables and the pre-CDS Small Bang dummy. The dummy takes the value of '1' between January 2008 and June 2009 and '0' otherwise. We estimate this model on the whole sample of firms as well as, separately, on the high-CDS and low-CDS subsamples. Table 7 reports the results. We confirm that the positive effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes is significantly lower in the pre-CDS Small Bang period, while the positive relationship between CDS illiquidity changes and spread changes is significantly larger in magnitude during this period. Additionally, we find that changes in the riskless interest rate have a stronger negative impact on spread changes before the implementation of the regulatory changes and that the relationship between changes in the term structure slope and spreads changes its sign after the CDS Small Bang. This supports the mixed evidence found by literature regarding the influence of changes in risk free rate and term structure slope on spread changes. Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of funding liquidity as well as of other explanatory variables display a strong time-varying behaviour, as previously noted by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Annaert et al. (2013) .
Adding to the explanatory variables employed in the models estimated, we also considered estimating the effect of funding illiquidity changes on spread changes when accounting for the market return, as in Annaert et al. (2013) . To proxy for market return we used the return on the Euro Stoxx 50 stock market index obtained from Thomson
Datastream. However, due to the very large negative correlation between the market return and market volatility (-0.72 for the whole sample and -0.80 in the pre-CDS Small Bang sub-sample), we chose to report results for models using only market volatility to avoid multicollinearity. In unreported results, we note that there are no significant changes in the signs or magnitudes of the coefficients for the variables included in the models when replacing market volatility with the market return.
Policy Recommendations
The results of our analysis suggest that funding illiquidity changes are a significant Furthermore, our results evidenced a pronounced time-varying effect of explanatory variables on spread changes, finding also documented by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Annaert et al. (2013) . Particularly during market downturns such as the Global Financial
Crisis, spreads display a higher sensitivity to CDS illiquidity and risk-free interest rates and a lower sensitivity to market volatility and funding liquidity. Therefore, in line with Annaert et al. (2013) , we highlight the importance for regulators to constantly assess the relative importance of firm-specific credit risk and liquidity variables as well as macroeconomic variables in explaining spreads, so that the correct market signals are highlighted and appropriate policies are implemented.
Conclusions
This study explores the effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes while controlling for other previously documented firm-specific and macroeconomic determinants of spreads. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study exploring the effect of changes in funding illiquidity on CDS spread changes. Using panel estimations, we find that changes in funding illiquidity have a significant positive effect on spread changes. This is in line with the hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity determines CDS protection sellers to reduce the supply of contracts in the market as they CDS spread levels data is obtained from Bloomberg. . ΔCDS is the monthly change in the mid-CDS spread (in basis points). All other variables are as described in Table 1 . (-8.42 ) (-8.12 ) (-7 .69) (-5 .39) (-5 (-11 .21) (-10 .94) (-7 .29) (-7 (-0.43 ) (-0 .61) (-3 .03) (-3 .17) Stock_return -0.71*** -0.71*** -0.71*** -0.57*** -0.57*** (-5.04 ) (-4 .87) (-5 .03) (-3 .28) (-3.20 (-4 .14) (-3 .45) (-3.85 ) (-4 .25) (-4 .30) Stock_return -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.39*** -0.37*** (-5.25 ) (-5 .04) (5.31) (-3 .26) (-3 (-10.75 ) (-9 .83) (-8.45 ) (-7 (-12 .48) (-11 .04) (-9 .79) (-8 (-8.50 ) (-8.49 ) (-8.50 ) (-6 .69) (-6.56 
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